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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
This appeal arises out of James Washington’s 
collateral attack on his convictions for second-degree murder, 
robbery, and criminal conspiracy related to his participation 
as the driver in a February 2000 store robbery that resulted in 
the deaths of two store employees.  Washington contends that 
the introduction into evidence of a jointly-tried nontestifying 
coconspirator’s confession violated his rights under the 
Confrontation Clause when the redacted confession replaced 
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Washington’s name with “someone I know” or “the driver.”  
A jury found Washington guilty, and Washington pursued all 
available direct and collateral state appeals before petitioning 
the District Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  The District 
Court conditionally granted the writ.  Washington v. Beard, 
867 F. Supp. 2d 701, 703 (E.D. Pa. 2012).  Because no 
reasonable reading of the Supreme Court’s Confrontation 
Clause jurisprudence would permit the introduction of the 
redacted confession allowed in this case, we will affirm. 
I. 
A. 
 At trial, the Commonwealth introduced evidence 
establishing that James Taylor, one of Washington’s friends, 
was hired as a stockperson at a Dollar Express Store in 
Philadelphia in January 2000.  Taylor observed that manager 
Gertrude Ritterson routinely arrived at the store at 5:00 a.m. 
and she would regularly smoke a cigarette on the back of the 
loading dock with the garage door open half-way before 
attending to her duties.  Taylor also noted that the store 
contained a safe in the office and employed no guards, video 
cameras, or other security measures – making it an “easy 
target” for his friends Washington, Willie Johnson, and 
Romont Waddy to rob. 
 On the night of February 23, 2000, the four men met at 
Waddy’s home to plan the robbery, which they intended to 
carry out the next day.  Johnson carried the gun they planned 
to use.  In the morning, Washington drove the group to the 
store.  Washington and Taylor remained in the car while 
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Waddy and Johnson entered, carrying tools needed to open a 
safe.  Waddy and Johnson confronted Ritterson and another 
employee.  Johnson then fired bullets through the heads of 
Ritterson and the other employee. 
 Washington heard the shots and ran into the store, 
where he helped remove $750 from the safe.  Waddy filled a 
trash bag with items from the store to sell.  Washington, 
Johnson, and Waddy then returned to the car, where Taylor 
asked why they had shot the employees.  Johnson complained 
about the small amount of money collected from the store and 
handed $50 to Waddy and $200 to Washington.  Taylor did 
not take any of the money. 
 Shortly after the incident, Taylor learned that the 
police had designated him a person of interest.  He 
surrendered to police and gave a statement.  He also agreed to 
testify against the other men in exchange for a sentence of 55 
to 110 years’ imprisonment.  Additionally, Waddy gave a 
statement to police on March 5, 2000. 
B. 
 Johnson, Waddy, and Washington were tried together 
before a jury in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia 
County in October and November 2001.  Taylor’s testimony 
at trial on October 25, 2001 identified all of the 
coconspirators and discussed in detail their roles in the crime.  
Taylor clearly and repeatedly identified Washington as the 
driver of the car: 
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“Q: What was Jiz [a nickname for Washington] 
or James Washington to do? 
A: Just to drive. 
Q: Why was that? 
A: Because he was the only one with a car. 
. . .  
A: Willie sat in the front, I sat in back of Willie, 
Romont sat back of Jiz, Jiz was the driver.” 
App. at 179, 181.  On cross-examination, Washington’s 
counsel pointed out significant inconsistencies in Taylor’s 
story, as well as Taylor’s history of drug and alcohol abuse 
and admittedly heavy impairment from drugs at the time of 
the incident. 
 On October 29, the jury heard a redacted version of 
Waddy’s confession, relayed to them as part of the testimony 
of Detective John Cummings.  Over Washington’s objection1 
that the redaction transparently referred to Washington, the 
                                              
1
 After Taylor’s testimony and before the reading of 
Waddy’s confession, Washington’s trial counsel stated in an 
objection to the redaction that Washington was “the only 
person that’s been identified as the driver.  I think it’s 
tantamount to using his name.”  App. at 238. 
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trial judge gave a limiting instruction
2
 and then allowed the 
detective read the redacted statement in response to questions 
from the prosecutor.
3
  The jury never saw the original or the 
redacted copy.  Cummings’s reading deleted all the names 
and nicknames of the defendants, which were replaced with 
                                              
2
 The judge told the jury, “Ladies and gentlemen, the 
statement of Romont Waddy which was given to Detective 
Cummings on March 5th may soon be read to you.  I caution 
you that you may consider the statement given by Mr. Waddy 
as evidence relating only to his guilt or non-guilt and not as 
evidence concerning the guilt or non-guilt of any other 
defendant.”  App. at 266. 
 
3
 Officer Cummings’s account of Waddy’s questioning 
by police included: 
 
 “Question: How long have you know the driver of the 
car you were in. 
 Answer: For a long time, like ten years. 
 Question: I’m showing you a photo. Do you recognize 
this person. 
 Answer: Yes, that’s the driver. 
 . . . 
 [Here, the testifying officer indicates that Waddy 
signed a photo of the driver.] 
 . . . 
 Question: Where does the driver live. 
 Answer: He was staying with his mom in Hill Creek.” 
 
App. at 270 (errors in the original). 
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words such as “someone I know,” “the other guy,” “the 
driver,” “the guy who went into the store,” and “the shooter.”  
The statement contained no reference to Washington by name 
or nickname. 
 Washington argued before the jury that he could not be 
guilty because he had an alibi for the time of the robbery, 
which he contended he had spent visiting his father in the 
hospital.  Conflicting evidence from the paramedics who had 
retrieved Washington’s father at home to transport him to the 
hospital, neighbors, and other family members who had 
visited the hospital cast some doubt on the veracity of 
Washington’s claims. 
 The jury found Washington guilty.  The trial judge 
sentenced Washington to two consecutive life terms of 
imprisonment for the murders and a concurrent term of ten to 
twenty years’ imprisonment for conspiracy.  For sentencing 
purposes, the robbery conviction merged. 
 The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed 
Washington’s conviction on direct appeal, and the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania denied Washington’s direct appeal.  
Commonwealth v. Washington, 832 A.2d 545 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2003), cert. denied, 847 A.2d 1285 (Pa. 2004).  In January 
2005, Washington challenged his convictions under the 
Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9541, et seq., alleging ineffective 
assistance of counsel and various violations of his 
constitutional rights.  The PCRA court denied his petition, 
and the Superior Court affirmed that decision.  
Commonwealth v. Washington, 981 A.2d 938 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
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2009).  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied 
Washington’s subsequent appeal.  Commonwealth v. 
Washington, 995 A.2d 353 (Pa. 2010). 
 On June 14, 2010, Washington filed a federal habeas 
petition in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which was 
initially reviewed by Magistrate Judge Strawbridge.  
Washington, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 703.  Judge Strawbridge 
recommended the denial of the petition on the merits.  Before 
the District Court, Washington raised eleven objections to the 
Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation.  Id. at 705.  The 
District Court sustained objection ten regarding Washington’s 
rights under the Confrontation Clause and granted a 
conditional writ of habeas corpus.  Id. at 709.  The 
government appeals from that decision. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over Washington’s 
collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  We have 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 
§ 2253(a).  Section 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. 
No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, gives substantial deference to 
state trial courts and limits habeas relief to those cases where 
the state court’s conclusion was contrary to clearly 
established federal law as embodied in the holdings of the 
Supreme Court or was an unreasonable application of that 
law.  See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 399, 411 (2000) 
(noting clearly established federal law is made up of the 
Supreme Court’s holdings, but not its dicta).  We conduct 
plenary review of the District Court’s legal conclusion that 
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the state court decision was an unreasonable application of 
federal law.  See Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 231 (3d 
Cir. 2004).  We presume that the factual findings of the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court are correct.  See Vazquez v. 
Wilson, 550 F.3d 270, 276 (3d Cir. 2008).  We perform an 
independent analysis as to the harm caused by the error rather 
than deferring to the state court’s conclusion.  Bond v. Beard, 
539 F.3d 256, 276 (3d Cir. 2008). 
III. 
 Washington asked the District Court to set aside his 
convictions because evidence introduced at trial violated his 
Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser.  We conclude 
that the District Court properly granted Washington habeas 
relief because (A) the Pennsylvania Superior Court 
unreasonably applied clearly established federal law when it 
concluded that the trial court had properly admitted into 
evidence redacted nontestifying coconspirator testimony and 
(B) that error substantially and injuriously affected 
Washington’s case. 
A. 
 AEDPA allows federal courts to grant relief from state 
court decisions that unreasonably apply federal law.  
Williams, 529 U.S. at 407.  If “‘fair-minded jurists could 
disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision,” 
federal habeas relief is precluded.  Harrington v. Richter, 131 
S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 
U.S. 652, 664 (2004)); see also Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 
U.S. 111, 122 (2009) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)) (“[I]t 
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is not ‘an unreasonable application of’ ‘clearly established 
Federal law’ for a state court to decline to apply a specific 
legal rule that has not been squarely established by [the 
Supreme] Court.”).  When a rule is general rather than 
specific, courts have “more leeway” in making case-by-case 
determinations.  Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664.  The District 
Court concluded that the Pennsylvania Superior Court had 
unreasonably applied clearly established federal law by 
drawing a bright-line rule that excluded from Confrontation 
Clause protection any confession that only becomes 
incriminating when linked to other evidence introduced at 
trial.  Washington, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 707.  We agree. 
 On the use of a nontestifying codefendant’s statement 
incriminating another defendant, Bruton v. United States, 391 
U.S. 123 (1968), Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987), 
and Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185 (1998), lay out the 
federal law as articulated by the Supreme Court.  Bruton held 
that a criminal defendant is deprived of his right to 
confrontation when a nontestifying codefendant’s confession 
names him, regardless of whether the judge has given the jury 
a limiting instruction.  391 U.S. at 126.  Although juries are 
generally presumed able to follow instructions about the 
applicability of the evidence, the Court in Bruton determined 
that a nontestifying codefendants’ confession that names the 
defendant poses too great a risk that the jury will use the 
evidence to determine the guilt or non-guilt of someone other 
than the confessor.  Id. at 135. 
In Richardson, the Court applied Bruton to a 
codefendant’s confession that had been redacted to eliminate 
any indication that anyone other than the speaker had 
 11 
participated in the crime.  481 U.S. at 203.  The Court held 
that the introduction of a redacted nontestifying codefendant 
statement that eliminates “not only the defendant’s name, but 
any reference to his or her existence” does not violate the 
Confrontation Clause because jurors are more likely to be 
able to follow a limiting instruction when “the confession was 
not incriminating on its face, and became so only when linked 
with evidence introduced later at trial” than they would be in 
cases like Bruton where the codefendant is facially implicated 
in the confession.  Id. at 208. 
 In Gray, the Court considered a redaction that replaced 
the defendant’s name with a deletion mark and held that 
obvious deletions that alert the jury to a redaction violate the 
Confrontation Clause because they encourage jurors to 
speculate about the reference and are accusatory in a way 
similar enough to the direct implication in Bruton to merit the 
same result.  See 523 U.S. at 195 (quoting Richardson, 481 
U.S. at 209) (“[T]he redacted confession with the blank 
prominent on its face, in Richardson’s words, ‘facially 
incriminat[es]’ the codefendant.  Like the confession in 
Bruton itself, the accusation that the redacted confession 
makes ‘is more vivid than inferential incrimination, and hence 
more difficult to thrust out of mind.’”). 
The Superior Court opinion demonstrates that it 
recognized and considered the correct holdings of the 
Supreme Court in reaching its decision.  App. at 72-73.  
Nonetheless, we conclude that the Superior Court 
unreasonably applied those holdings to the facts of 
Washington’s case because it ignored Gray’s admonition to 
look to the kind rather than the mere fact of inference.  As we 
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will explain, the result in this case – where the trial court 
allowed a redaction that was plainly transparent at the time 
the testimony was given – demonstrates the absurdity of a 
bright-line interpretation of Richardson. 
 In its brief discussion of the issue, the Superior Court 
held in this case that its previous precedent fully foreclosed 
Washington’s claim that replacing his name with “someone I 
know” or “the driver” violated his rights under the 
Confrontation Clause.  See App. at 72-73 (citing 
Commonwealth v. Travers, 768 A.2d 845 (Pa. 2001)).  In 
Travers, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a 
redaction referring to the codefendant as “the other man” did 
not offend the Confrontation Clause because it was not 
“powerfully incriminating on its face.”  768 A.2d at 851.  
According to the Travers court, Richardson limited the 
Bruton rule and “expressly rejected the theory of contextual 
implication, recognizing the important distinction between 
co-defendant confessions that expressly incriminate the 
defendant and those that become incriminating only when 
linked to other evidence properly introduced at trial.”  
Travers, 768 A.2d at 848.  Consequently, the Superior Court 
explained that Travers disposed of Washington’s claim 
because Washington’s “identity was indeed only clarified by 
Taylor’s testimony, a curative instruction was given, and the 
redaction of Waddy’s statement was proper in and of itself.”  
App. at 73. 
 The Commonwealth urges us to treat this case as one 
about the propriety of redactions that employ neutral 
pronouns and phrases, a method about which we and other 
Courts of Appeals have noted that the Supreme Court has 
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expressed no opinion.  Vazquez, 550 F.3d at 279; see also, 
e.g., Spears v. Mullin, 343 F.3d 1215, 1232 (10th Cir. 2003) 
(noting lack of Supreme Court guidance directly on point and 
upholding redaction wherein an officer paraphrased the 
codefendant statement, replacing names with “others” or 
“they”); McGhee v. Yukins, 229 F.3d 506, 512 (6th Cir. 
2000); United States v. Edwards, 159 F.3d 1117, 1125 (8th 
Cir. 1998). 
 To that end, the Commonwealth argues that given the 
lack of explicit instruction from the Supreme Court, the 
differing decisions among the lower courts demonstrates that 
the Superior Court applied Bruton and its progeny within the 
range of reasonable opinions.  See Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 
786.  As evidence of the wide range of acceptable options, the 
government points to other Courts of Appeals that have 
interpreted Gray as permitting redactions (accompanied by a 
limiting instruction) that employ neutral pronouns and 
phrases.  See, e.g., United States v. Lighty, 616 F.3d 321, 376-
79 (4th Cir. 2010) (approving redaction that replaced names 
with “three other people” because the confession itself gave 
no way to identify them); United States v. Vasilakos, 508 F.3d 
401, 407 (6th Cir. 2007) (approving redaction with “another 
person” or “another individual”); United States v. Logan, 210 
F.3d 820, 821-22 (8th Cir. 2000) (considering redaction 
without regard to other evidence and approving neutral-
pronoun redactions).  The Commonwealth also notes that 
Gray cited approvingly to Sixth and Second Circuit opinions 
that had approved redactions that replaced a codefendants 
name with “someone” and “all three of us.”  See United 
States v. Garcia, 836 F.2d 385 (8th Cir. 1987); Clark v. 
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Maggio, 737 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1984).  Furthermore, the 
Commonwealth argues that the redaction of Waddy’s 
statement is acceptable because Gray explicitly stated that 
“me and a few other guys” would be acceptable and, although 
the District Court expressed concern that the redaction made 
reference to Washington’s role in the conspiracy, nothing in 
Supreme Court precedent specifically bans this practice. 
Other courts have approved similar alterations that make 
reference to roles.  See, e.g., United States v. Green, 648 F.3d 
569, 575-76 (7th Cir. 2011) (approving the replacement of 
codefendant’s name with “the strawbuyer,” but noting that the 
redaction came “very close to the Bruton line”); United States 
v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 149 (2d Cir. 2003) (approving the 
replacement of codefendant’s name with “my neighbor”). 
 We have no doubt that redactions replacing names 
with neutral pronouns and phrases will often fit comfortably 
within the range of acceptable approaches outlined by Bruton, 
Richardson, and Gray.  This is not one of those cases.  The 
Superior Court applied a blanket rule, derived from Travers, 
that any redaction that would require a juror to consider an 
additional piece of information outside the confession in 
order to identify the coconspirator being referred to 
automatically falls inside the realm of Richardson.  This is 
not a reasonable view of the law. 
 In Richardson, the Supreme Court distinguished the 
redacted confession from the unredacted confession that had 
been used in Bruton, because the Bruton confession “had 
expressly implicated” the defendant and “at the time that 
confession was introduced there was not the slightest doubt 
that it would prove ‘powerfully incriminating.’”  481 U.S. at 
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208 (quoting Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135).  The Richardson 
confession, on the other hand, “was not incriminating on its 
face, and became so only when linked with evidence 
introduced later at trial.”  Id.  The Richardson Court reasoned 
that: 
“w]here the necessity of such linkage is 
involved, it is a less valid generalization that the 
jury will not likely obey the instruction to 
disregard the evidence.  Specific testimony that 
‘the defendant helped me commit the crime’ is 
more vivid than inferential incrimination, and 
hence more difficult to thrust out of mind.  
Moreover, with regard to such an explicit 
statement the only issue is, plain and simply, 
whether the jury can possibly be expected to 
forget it in assessing the defendant’s guilt; 
whereas with regard to inferential incrimination 
the judge’s instruction may well be successful 
in dissuading the jury from entering onto the 
path of inference in the first place, so that there 
is no incrimination to forget.  In short, while it 
may not always be simple for the members of a 
jury to obey the instruction that they disregard 
an incriminating inference, there does not exist 
the overwhelming probability of their inability 
to do so that is the foundation of Bruton’s 
exception to the general rule. 
Even more significantly, evidence requiring 
linkage differs from evidence incriminating on 
its face in the practical effects which application 
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of the Bruton exception would produce. If 
limited to facially incriminating confessions, 
Bruton can be complied with by redaction—a 
possibility suggested in that opinion itself.  If 
extended to confessions incriminating by 
connection, not only is that not possible, but it 
is not even possible to predict the admissibility 
of a confession in advance of trial. The 
‘contextual implication’ doctrine articulated by 
the Court of Appeals would presumably require 
the trial judge to assess at the end of each trial 
whether, in light of all of the evidence, a 
nontestifying codefendant’s confession has been 
so ‘powerfully incriminating’ that a new, 
separate trial is required for the defendant.  This 
obviously lends itself to manipulation by the 
defense—and even without manipulation will 
result in numerous mistrials and appeals.” 
Id. at 208-09 (internal citations omitted). 
 The Gray Court recognized, however, that this 
reasoning could not apply equally to all inferences.  In 
distinguishing the case from Richardson, the Court examined 
the effect of redactions that incriminate inferentially: 
“But inference pure and simple cannot make the 
critical difference, for if it did, then Richardson 
would also place outside Bruton’s scope 
confessions that use shortened first names, 
nicknames, descriptions as unique as the ‘red-
haired, bearded, one-eyed man-with-a-limp,’ 
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and perhaps even full names of defendants who 
are always known by a nickname.  This Court 
has assumed, however, that nicknames and 
specific descriptions fall inside, not outside, 
Bruton’s protection. . . .  Richardson must 
depend in significant part upon the kind of, not 
the simple fact of, inference.  Richardson’s 
inferences involved statements that did not refer 
directly to the defendant himself and which 
became incriminating ‘only when linked with 
evidence introduced later at trial.’  The 
inferences at issue here involve statements that, 
despite redaction, obviously refer directly to 
someone, often obviously the defendant, and 
which involve inferences that a jury ordinarily 
could make immediately, even were the 
confession the very first item introduced at 
trial.” 
523 U.S. at 195-96 (citations omitted).
4
 
                                              
4
 We reject the assertion that this reasoning represents 
non-binding dicta that cannot constitute clearly established 
federal law.  See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 399, 411 
(2000) (clearly established federal law includes the Supreme 
Court’s holdings, but not its dicta); see also Kastigar v. 
United States, 406 U.S. 441, 454-55 (1972) (“[B]road 
language” that was “unnecessary to the Court’s decision . . . 
cannot be considered binding authority.”).  Distinguishing 
Richardson was necessary and central to the result in Gray v. 
Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 195-96 (1998). 
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The Commonwealth urges us to read Gray narrowly 
and avoid looking at “all the evidence admitted at trial” 
because Gray was simply disapproving the kind of inferences 
required to link Kevin Gray to the word “deleted.”  Here, the 
Commonwealth misstates the argument against it.  In fact, we 
need not look at “all the evidence,” which would require trial 
courts to somehow look ahead through future testimony in 
order to make a Bruton ruling.  The question here turns on 
what information was available to the trial court before it 
overruled Washington’s objection, instructed the jury, and 
allowed Detective Cummings to read Waddy’s confession.  
Taylor had already testified four days earlier, naming 
Washington as “the driver.”5  It should have been apparent “at 
the time that confession was introduced there was not the 
slightest doubt that it would prove powerfully incriminating.”  
Richardson, 481 U.S. at 208.  The problems with Waddy’s 
confession were immediately obvious before the jury heard 
the statement and did not become so only “when linked with 
evidence introduced later at trial.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 The problem with Waddy’s confession becomes more 
apparent upon consideration of how the inferences in these 
cases actually work.  In Gray, the Court guarded against the 
negative conclusions jurors might draw from a blank or 
deletion marking, which would alert them to the fact that a 
redaction had occurred and raise suspicions that the change 
                                              
5
 Taylor testified on October 25, and Detective 
Cummings read Waddy’s statement to the jury on October 29.  
During the period between those days, the jury heard 
testimony for approximately three hours on October 26. 
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had been made to protect someone:  the codefendant.  But the 
Court also identified other kinds of inferences that would 
allow a jury to so easily connect a redaction with a particular 
person that the redaction would be tantamount to using the 
codefendant’s name in violation of Bruton.  For example, the 
Court specifically noted that physical descriptions would 
violate Bruton; after all, the jury would need to only look to 
counsel table to find someone who matched.  But appearance, 
as the Gray dissent points out, is not “evidence” that would 
be included in Richardson’s admonition against considering 
“evidence introduced later at trial.”  See 523 U.S. at 201-02 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Since the defendant’s appearance at 
counsel table is not evidence, the description ‘red-haired, 
bearded, one-eyed man-with-a-limp,’ would be facially 
incriminating – unless, of course, the defendant had dyed his 
hair black and shaved his beard before trial, and the 
prosecution introduced evidence concerning his former 
appearance.”). 
 Nicknames, which the Court has assumed fall within 
the protection of Bruton, provide perhaps the best analogy to 
Washington’s case.  The connection between a defendant and 
a nickname (other than a simple shortening of a given name) 
requires extrinsic evidence to incriminate.  Without that 
additional piece of information, a confession containing a 
nickname would not be incriminating.  And, unlike physical 
appearance, the link often would be provided by “evidence.”  
In this case, for example, Taylor testified both that 
Washington was “the driver” and that he went by the 
nickname “Jiz.”  Clearly, Supreme Court precedent would not 
permit a redaction that replaced Washington’s name in 
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Waddy’s confession with “Jiz.”  Given that “the Driver” and 
“Jiz” both incriminate Washington because of pieces of 
information that earlier testimony had made readily available 
to the judge and jury before Waddy’s confession was 
admitted, there does not seem to be a principled distinction 
between a redaction that identifies Washington as “the driver” 
and one that refers to him as “Jiz.” 
 The inference connecting the defendant and confession 
in Richardson worked differently.  There, the confession gave 
no indication that Marsh was in the car as the coconspirators 
discussed the murder.  481 U.S. at 203-04.  Later at trial, 
Marsh testified that she was in the car but did not hear the 
discussion.  Id.  Considering all the evidence, the jury could 
have concluded that Marsh knew in advance about the 
murder, since she had placed herself in the car, but that would 
require the jury to come to a number of conclusions from the 
facts – for example, that Marsh could not have been where 
she said she was and not have heard the conversation 
described in the confession. 
 We recognize that the Gray Court described the kind 
of inferences covered by Bruton as those that “a jury 
ordinarily could make immediately, even were the confession 
the very first item introduced at trial.”  523 U.S. at 196 
(emphasis added).  Clearly, limiting the relevant inferences in 
this manner takes Taylor’s testimony out of consideration.  
But this statement is best understood in light of the sentences 
that immediately follow, noting that such a limitation 
addresses the policy concerns raised in Richardson that 
allowing consideration of all the evidence would make it 
impossible for courts to know before a trial’s conclusion 
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which redactions would be acceptable – effectively requiring 
the severance of all trials where this kind of confession would 
be introduced.  That consideration is not relevant here, given 
that the trial judge had the needed information and could have 
ordered changes to the redaction based on Taylor’s testimony 
before the jury heard Waddy’s confession. 
 In sum, no reasonable reading of Bruton, Richardson, 
and Gray can tolerate a redaction that the trial judge knew at 
the time of introduction would be transparent to the jurors.  
Taylor’s testimony clearly and explicitly identified 
Washington as the driver.  Replacing Washington’s name 
with “the driver” was, as counsel stated, tantamount to using 
Washington’s name and cannot be allowed to stand, even in 
light of AEDPA’s deferential standard of review. 
 While we recognize that only the holdings of the 
Supreme Court bind us in this posture, we note that this 
decision comports with our other recent opinions explaining 
the reasonable range of application of the Supreme Court’s 
Bruton jurisprudence.  In Vazquez, the redacted confession 
implicated two others in the crime, one of whom the 
confessor referred to as “[his] boy” and “the other guy.”  550 
F.3d at 274.  Although we acknowledged that these terms 
might usually satisfy Bruton, we criticized the Pennsylvania 
court’s categorical approval of neutral-pronoun redactions 
and held that “using a bright line is ‘an unreasonable 
application of clearly established Federal law under the 
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States’ given 
the necessity of determining how strongly a codefendant’s 
statement implicates the defendant and the likelihood that it 
would be disregarded by the jury.”  Pabon v. Mahanoy, 654 
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F.3d 385, 395 (3d Cir. 2011) (describing Vazquez and 
granting certificate of appealability on Bruton question).
6
  
Since the briefing began in this case, we have reaffirmed in 
Eley v. Erickson our view that the application of a bright-line 
rule to neutral redactions unreasonably applies federal law.  
See 712 F.3d 837, 861 (3d Cir. 2013).  Although AEDPA 
demands that we look to Supreme Court precedent and not 
our own holdings in answering the Confrontation Clause 
question presented here, the reasoning we explained in 
Vazquez and Eley about the shorthand approach the 
                                              
6
 The Commonwealth argues that Vazquez, to the 
extent that it explains how we have viewed Supreme Court 
precedent in the past, can be distinguished on its facts.  In 
Vazquez, the trial court allowed the prosecutor to emphasize 
before the jury that the confessor had in fact identified the 
other men involved to police, making the facts that he had 
named names and that his statement had been redacted 
transparent in violation of Gray.  Vazquez v. Wilson, 550 F.3d 
270, 274-75 (3d Cir. 2008).  Additionally, the prosecutor and 
a witness broke redaction during the trial.  Id.  The jury 
clearly drew inferences from the evidence and events at trial, 
as questions from the jury during deliberations revealed that 
they believed the statement referred to Vazquez as the 
shooter.  Nonetheless, the Commonwealth misrepresents 
Vazquez’s holding.  The Vazquez court specifically 
disclaimed that these facts had impacted its holding, noting 
that its decision was based on the record before the trial judge 
at the time the redacted confession was admitted and not on 
events that occurred later at trial.  Id. at 277. 
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Pennsylvania Superior Court has taken in following Travers 
has equal application to this case.  Clearly, neutral pronoun 
and phrase redactions will often meet the standards laid out in 
Bruton, Richardson, and Gray.  But Washington’s case 
presents some of the unusual circumstances where a facially 
neutral redaction cannot reasonably be viewed as satisfying 
the Confrontation Clause – illustrating how the bright-line 
rule adopted by the Superior Court proves inadequate to 
protect codefendants’ rights.  The course taken by the trial 
court posed an obvious and serious risk that the jury would, 
contrary to the instruction it received, weigh Waddy’s 
confession in its determination of Washington’s guilt or non-
guilt.  Therefore, despite the large measure of deference we 
owe to the state courts, we conclude that the Superior Court 
unreasonably applied clearly established federal law. 
B. 
 Because the Pennsylvania Superior Court 
unreasonably applied clearly established federal law, we next 
consider whether the Confrontation Clause error had the 
“substantial and injurious effect” on Washington’s case 
required to merit relief.  Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 121-22 
(2007).  If we were to conclude that the error did not 
influence the jury or that it had “but very slight effect,” we 
would uphold the judgment.  See Adamson v. Cathel, 633 
F.3d 248, 260 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding an error not 
substantially injurious where there was “overwhelming” 
evidence as to the crime itself, but not as to Adamson’s 
involvement).  But “grave doubt” about the effect of the error 
means “we must conclude that the error was not harmless.”  
Id.; see also Fry, 551 U.S. at 121 n.3 (citing O’Neal v. 
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McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 435 (1995)).  We perform an 
independent analysis as to the harm caused by the error rather 
than deferring to the state court’s conclusion.  Bond, 539 F.3d 
at 276 (holding that error did not have a substantial and 
injurious effect where an independent eyewitness had 
identified petitioner and petitioner had confessed, though he 
later argued his confession was coerced). 
 The District Court concluded that the Confrontation 
Clause error substantially injured Washington because the 
only significant evidence against him came from Taylor’s 
testimony.  Washington, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 709.  According 
to the District Court, Taylor’s testimony suffered from 
substantial credibility problems, both because of his history of 
drug and alcohol abuse and because of his possible incentive 
as a participant in the crime to distort the story to his own 
benefit at trial.  Id.  Washington adds that Taylor lied 
repeatedly to police during questioning and in earlier judicial 
proceedings and analogizes his case to Vazquez, where we 
held that the Bruton violation had caused a substantial and 
injurious effect on the trial despite the existence of other, 
often contradictory, evidence at trial that implicated Vazquez 
beyond the coconspirator confession, including fingerprint 
evidence.  See Vazquez, 550 F.3d at 282-83. 
 The Commonwealth offers several reasons why the 
redaction error cannot have caused a substantial and injurious 
effect.  First, the Commonwealth argues that the error could 
not have been sufficiently consequential given the 
government’s relatively light evidentiary burden:  to convict 
Washington of second-degree murder, the government needed 
only to show that Washington took part in the robbery.  See 
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18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2502(b).  The Commonwealth describes 
Washington’s complaint as having been identified as the 
driver and argues that this could have no impact because the 
government did not need to prove any particular role for him 
to be found guilty – only that he was involved in the robbery.  
This argument dramatically underplays the effect of Waddy’s 
confession.  At trial, Washington challenged the truthfulness 
of Taylor’s statement and attempted to support this argument 
during cross-examination by identifying a number of reasons 
why the jury could question Taylor’s truthfulness.  Waddy’s 
statement accusing “the driver” stood before the jury with no 
opportunity for rebuttal, providing corroboration for Taylor’s 
claims without the liability of Taylor’s drug use and 
impairment at the times of the events in question or his 
history of changing his story about the robbery. 
 Second, the Commonwealth argues that Waddy’s 
statement cannot have had a substantial and injurious effect 
because Taylor’s testimony standing alone provided all the 
evidence against Washington the government needed.  
Acknowledging some of the problems with Taylor’s 
testimony, the Commonwealth maintains that Taylor’s 
testimony alone still would have been dispositive because 
Taylor consistently stated Washington’s role, despite 
changing on other issues, and provided sufficient evidence to 
meet the relatively low factual requirements of second-degree 
murder.  Taylor’s testimony about other issues, but not 
Washington’s role, was corroborated by other witnesses. 
 The trial judge, in a ruling assessing the weight and 
sufficiency of the evidence after trial, called the evidence 
against Washington “credible and essentially uncontradicted.”  
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App. at 84.  The Commonwealth contends that this factual 
finding, to the extent that the evidence against Washington 
includes Taylor’s testimony, binds us and should have 
prevented the District Court from basing its conclusion on the 
potential problems with Taylor’s testimony that the jury could 
have identified.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (“[A] 
determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be 
presumed to be correct.  The applicant shall have the burden 
of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and 
convincing evidence.”); Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 
434 (1983) (“28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) gives federal habeas courts 
no license to redetermine credibility of witnesses whose 
demeanor has been observed by the state trial court, but not 
by them.”).  But AEDPA’s high standard of deference does 
not apply to our analysis of the error’s impact.  Bond, 539 
F.3d at 276.  At Washington’s trial, Taylor’s credibility was 
an issue before the jury.  Our task is to determine whether 
Waddy’s confession had a substantial and injurious effect on 
the decision made by the jury.  The trial court’s determination 
post-trial that the evidence had been sufficient to convict is 
not the relevant consideration. 
 Finally, the Commonwealth contends that the error 
could not have substantially injured Washington because he 
provided a “weak” rebuttal of character evidence from family 
members and a “hopelessly contradictory” alibi.  At trial, 
testimony from family members and the paramedics who 
brought Washington’s father to the hospital presented 
conflicting timelines about when Washington was with his 
father.  But the fact that Washington’s alibi evidence may not 
have been conclusive does not ultimately answer the question 
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before us.  The Commonwealth had the burden of proving 
Washington’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
Washington’s trial strategy included raising doubts about the 
credibility of Taylor’s testimony.  Because of the way it was 
redacted, Waddy’s confession undercut that effort by 
appearing to corroborate Taylor’s evidence about “the 
driver.” 
 Ultimately, Washington has shown enough of a 
probable impact on the jury to create “grave doubt” about the 
consequences of the Confrontation Clause error.  Adamson, 
633 F.3d at 260.  We therefore conclude that the Superior 
Court erred on the Confrontation Clause issue and that such 
error was sufficiently injurious to warrant relief. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the June 7, 
2012 order of the District Court.  Consistent with that order, 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania shall either release or 
retry Washington within 120 days of entry of this order.
7
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 The Duquesne Law School Federal Practice Clinic 
ably represented Washington in this appeal.  We thank the 
students and the law school for their service. 
